Are you claiming it is in fact equivalent to the standard “trolley problem”? (I don’t think you are, but if you are, I’ll add)
If the point is even “arguable”, I claim that is enough to distinguish it from the trolley problem, because that argument doesn’t come up there.
That was my point. I agree that the consciousness that emerged is distinct from Tuvok (or of course Neelix, but I felt like an ass last time I used the “say Tuvok” construction).
Are you claiming it is in fact equivalent to the standard “trolley problem”? (I don’t think you are, but if you are, I’ll add)
Not exactly, was more thinking along the lines of both choices involving an end to the consciousness of one or the other. Either Tuvok and Neelix are held in limbo/non-existent from that point onwards, or Tuvix is unwound.
If the point is even “arguable”, I claim that is enough to distinguish it from the trolley problem, because that argument doesn’t come up there.
But I am curious, would it not? From my understanding, at the end of the shift, you’re still sacrificing one life to save two, or two to save one, which seems like it would harken back to the fundamentals of the issue. Assuming that no cloning or replicative shenanigans takes place, either Neelix/Tuvok are retained, or Tuvix is.
That said, there was some leeway in that Janeway had no urgent time-pressure to return them back to their bodies at the time, unlike with something like Transport-split Kirk. She mentions needing her crew back, but that could easily happen at some point in the future, and that might alter the variables of the problem, since part of the trolley problem is that there isn’t any time to take a third option, nor get help from other places.
