I’m not saying they’re identical, I’m saying they’re both “you”. That’s different.

There are many "you"s already. Consider “you” at different points in time. You recognise it’s all the same individual, but they are not identical.

Hence my last sentence. We’re comfortable with a variety of non-identical "you"s separated by time. So why not a variety of non-identical "you"s at same time, only separated by space.

Our definition of identity is not tight because it doesn’t have to deal with situations like these. We having a working definition something like “the continuous experience of memories, personality and sensation in a body” that serves to help us identify the “you” from yesterday as the same person as the “you” now. They’re not identical. What they have in common is a shared continuous physicality.

But if some sci-fi type cloning were possible where two "you"s step out from the one, then both could claim to have a shared continuous physical continuity with the “you” now. And as such both have the same and equal claim on who is the “real” one. As because of that why can’t they both be you? Both with separate ongoing experiences. But both “you” in every bit the same way as you claim to be the same “you” as yesterday.