Some preliminary thoughts on this new phase in the war focusing on key developments: 1) Israel’s act of state terrorism which killed Seyyid Hasan Nasrallah and its impact on Hizbullah, 2) The impact of Israel’s elimination of Hizbullah’s military command, 3) The current transition phase and Hizbullah’s strategic recalibration. It’s evident that Israel, with the full backing and partnership of the US, aimed to dismantle Hizbullah in one decisive strike. This effort began with the assassination of Fuad Shukr in late July, followed by the pager attacks, but it was Nasrallah’s killing that served as the key trigger intended to spark Hizbullah’s expected implosion. While Israel’s push for a regional war seems evident, it’s still uncertain whether the US is fully prepared to commit to such a course.

It is difficult to quantify the magnitude of Nasrallah’s loss for Hizbullah and the Axis as a whole. However, this does not mean Hizbullah is anywhere near the verge of collapse. Israel and the US misunderstand the nature of his leadership—people didn’t support the cause because of him; they supported him because he personified their cause of justice and liberation, and while he was a revered figure, the cause he embodied will outlive him. Nasrallah will live on not just as a model of resistance or political consciousness, but as a rationality—a kind of ‘Nasrallah raison’. To think the group would crumble without Nasrallah is a fundamental misreading, and a racist assumption that reduces Hizbullah—a complex and deeply-rooted movement—to a single individual, reinforcing a stereotype that such groups in the Middle East rely on charismatic “strongmen” rather than institutional strength, resilience, or popular grass-roots support. It reflects a broader Orientalist view that discounts the ability of non-Western organizations to function as sophisticated political or military entities, capable of enduring beyond the loss of one leader.

Similarly, while Israel’s elimination of Hizbullah’s entire military command [has this been confirmed? I was under the impression that Hezbollah denied this and that only a small number of officials were present with Nasrallah] was a devastating blow that would have crippled most states, Hizbullah’s ability to continue launching sustained strikes against Israel highlights its operational continuity and the resilience of its command-and-control structure. The reason Hizbullah has been able to withstand such significant losses is its exceptionally robust continuity of command, enabling a seamless transition of leadership even in times of severe crisis.

It’s important to recall that Hizbullah was born out of war and invasion, shaping it into an organization with built-in resilience. It’s designed to continually regenerate its leadership, producing new generations of military commanders. This resilience was most evident in 2008 when Hizbullah lost its senior military commander, Hajj Imad Mughnieh, who was not just a foundational figure but the pioneer of the Resistance’s “New School of [hybrid] Warfare”. Far from being weakened by his assassination, and the killing of his successor, Mustafa Badereddine in 2013, Hizbullah’s military capabilities have since grown exponentially, with its tactics being adopted by allies across the Resistance Axis. Since Mughnieh’s assassination, Hizbullah has implemented a sophisticated system of knowledge distribution at the operational level. This distributed expertise ensures that the loss of any single leader, even one in a high-ranking position, does not create a critical gap in the group’s operational capabilities, allowing for rapid reorganization and continuity of operations. Hizbullah has made contingencies for multiple lines of commanders, so if the first is killed and replaced, the second can immediately step in, and if he too is killed, a third will take over, and so on. Several men are delegated with overlapping roles and tasks, ensuring that any void left by a fallen leader is quickly filled, allowing for rapid reorganization and seamless continuity of operations.

None of this suggests that Hizbullah hasn’t been severely bruised and momentarily weakened—more so than at any point in its history. This is undeniably a turning point. The organization is navigating a critical transition phase, absorbing consecutive shocks while attempting to recuperate, reconfigure, and reorganize. It is likely revising both its grand strategy and military approach, shifting from its previous support front with Gaza to developing a new defense strategy that will likely focus on repelling Israel’s seemingly imminent ground invasion and forcing it to end its aerial aggression. At the same time, Hizbullah is likely drawing up contingency plans for a broader “Great War” strategy—one that would be offensively driven, should Israel and the U.S. seek to engulf the entire region in war.