The malicious changes were submitted by JiaT75, one of the two main xz Utils developers with years of contributions to the project.
“Given the activity over several weeks, the committer is either directly involved or there was some quite severe compromise of their system,” an official with distributor OpenWall wrote in an advisory. “Unfortunately the latter looks like the less likely explanation, given they communicated on various lists about the ‘fixes’” provided in recent updates. Those updates and fixes can be found here, here, here, and here.
On Thursday, someone using the developer’s name took to a developer site for Ubuntu to ask that the backdoored version 5.6.1 be incorporated into production versions because it fixed bugs that caused a tool known as Valgrind to malfunction.
“This could break build scripts and test pipelines that expect specific output from Valgrind in order to pass,” the person warned, from an account that was created the same day.
One of maintainers for Fedora said Friday that the same developer approached them in recent weeks to ask that Fedora 40, a beta release, incorporate one of the backdoored utility versions.
“We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added),” the Ubuntu maintainer said.
He has been part of the xz project for two years, adding all sorts of binary test files, and with this level of sophistication, we would be suspicious of even older versions of xz until proven otherwise.
Who wants to bet he received a nice lump sum deposit of cash from a five eyes state to make an “accident”…
Thankfully this was discovered before hitting stable distros but I’m hoping it increases scrutiny across the board. We dodged a bullet on this one.
Across the board indeed. Scrutiny in code is one thing, where this story, as far as is known right now, really went south is the abuse of a trusted, but vulnerable, member of the community.
I know the (negative) spotlight is targeting Jia Tan right now (and who knows if they (still) exist), but I really hope Larhzu is doing okay. Who’s name is mentioned in the same articles.
Mental health is a serious issue, that, if you read the back story, is easily ignored or abused. And it wasn’t an unknown in this story. Don’t only check the code, check up on your people too.
Please help me as a novice Linux user- is this something that comes preinstalled with Mint Cinnamon? And if so, what can I do about it?
You’re good. Even if you do use xz and ssh the version with the vulnerability only made it’s way to rolling release distros or beta version of distros like fedora 40
dpkg --list | grep xz
should return what version of xz package is on your system. Likely 5.4, in which case you should be okay.
ii xz-utils 5.2.5-2ubuntu1 amd64 XZ-format compression utilities On my latest Mint install.
It says “5.2.5-2ubuntu1.” So I’ll have to see about updating it.
EDIT: However, this says I should be safe: https://forums.linuxmint.com/viewtopic.php?t=416756
As the other person said it’s likely that xz
is already installed on your system, but almost certainly a much older version than the compromised one. It’s likely that no action is required on your part assuming you’ve not been downloading tarballs of bleeding edge software.
As the other person said, just keep doing updates as soon Mint recommends them (since it’s based on Ubuntu LTS, it’s a lot less likely to have these bleeding edge vulnerabilities).
The library itself is very common and used by a lot of things (in this case it seems that the payload only activated when used by specific programs, like SSH).
What you can do about it is keep your system up-to-date using your distribution update mechanisms. This kind of thing, when found out, is usually fixed quickly in security updates. In Mint (which I don’t use, but I believe is based on either debian or ubuntu, which uses dpkg/apt) security updates are flagged differently anc can be installed automatically, depending on your configuration.
tl;dr: keep your system up-to-date, it will keep known vulnerabilities away as much as it can;
In this case though the backdoor was added recently so updating could do the opposite of help here. Luckily I don’t think any stable distros added the new version.
It was added recently, but at this point in the timeline, fixes are available for most mainstream distro at least. Except for rare cases where a fix can’t be made available quickly, this kind of publicity is only done when a fix is broadly available. There are extreme cases of course, but in this case, it’s fixed.
Thanks. I do my best to regularly update, so here’s hoping it will not be a problem for me before an update fixes it!
There are no known reports of those versions being incorporated into any production releases for major Linux distributions
…
A stable release of Arch Linux is also affected.
… BTW.
I liked the joke, but ya arch is not compromised. Check out this user’s detailed comment.
The malicious code is only thought to have affected deb/rpm packaging (i.e the backdoor only included itself with those packaging methods). Additionally, arch doesn’t link ssh against liblzma which means this specific vulnerability wasn’t applicable to arch. Arch may have still been vulnerable in other ways, but this specific vulnerability targeted deb/rpm distros